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Merleau-Ponty never wrote a phenomenology of sympathy. But 
his use of sympathy in accounting for human relationships parallels in 
intent and manner his treatment of perception in the Phenomenology.} In 
addressing the paradox of alterity, he draws an analogy between 
perception and sympathy: just as perceptual consciousness founds 
intersubjective thematic experience, in the same way pre-personal 
sympathy accounts for the possibility of affective intersubjective relations. 
Just as my body, as the system of all my holds on the 
world, founds the unity of the objects I perceive, in the 
same way the body of the other—as the bearer of 
symbolic behaviors and of the behavior of true reality-
tears itself away from being one of my phenomena, 
offers me the task of a true communication, and confers 
on my objects the new dimension of intersubjective 
being or, in other words, of objectivity (PrP in PoP 18). 
Along with operative intentionality—awareness of the existential, lived • 
horizon against which we thematize the world—the primordial affect of 
sympathy in early ontogenesis and in adulthood exercises primacy over 
thematic and deliberate relations of sympathy and antipathy. 
Just as the perception of a thing opens me up to being, 
by realizing the paradoxical synthesis of an infinity or 
perceptual aspects, in the same way the perception of 
1 Abbreviations for cited texts by Maurice Merleau-Ponty— 
AD: Adventures of the Dialectic, trans. Joseph Bien (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
PP: Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routlege 
and Kegan Paul, 1962). 
PoP: The Primacy of Perception, trans. Silverman, ed. James M. Edie 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964). 
PrP: T h e Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Significance," in 
PoP: 12-42. 
RO: 'The Child's Relations with Others," in PoP: 96-155. 
SN: Sense and Nonsense , trans. Herbert L. Dreyfus and Patricia A. 
Dreyfus (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964). 
VI: The Visible and the Invisible, trans. Alphonso Lingis, ed. 
Lefort (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). 
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the other founds morality by realizing the paradox of an 
alter ego, of a common situation, by placing my perspec-
tives and my incommunicable solitude in the visual field 
of another and of all the others (PrP in PoP 26). 
Even though there is a direct analogy between the primacy of perception 
in cognition and the primacy of sympathy for affective relations, the 
parallelism breaks down when we compare the thetic acts of judgment 
with explicit acts of sympathy in love and dialogue. The relation between 
perception and cognition is a founded matter of fact, in pre-thematic and 
thetic acts of understanding alike. Nevertheless, the need to realize 
sympathy in responsible and deliberate acts is an ethical imperative Even 
though master and slave relations in their violence presuppose the horizon 
of sympathy, an achievement of love and dialogue is not guaranteed by 
this latent affective horizon. 
I argue that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of love and 
dialogue correctly depicts pre-personal sympathy as the ontology of 
ethical life. But he is not always careful in making the distinction between 
the ontological and the ethical level of. analysis. One can thematize the 
ethical primacy of sympathy over adult conflictual relations only when the 
operative conditions of love and dialogue are fulfilled also in thematic and 
deliberate acts. Still, his phenomenology of sympathy can provide a 
ground-work for communicative and existential ethics when the following 
three stages in human development are kept descriptively and critically 
distinct: the legitimate privileging of pre-personal sympathy in founding 
and sustaining alterity and self-identity in early ontogenesis and in 
adulthood; ordinary and pathological failures in sustaining self-identity 
and intersubjective relations in conflict, jealousy, and various mental 
disturbances; and the thematic and deliberate recovery of primordial 
sympathy as the founding pole in an adult sympathy of love and discourse. 
This paper will explicate Merleau-Ponty's philosophical use of 
operative intentionality and critically examine whether and how his thesis 
of the primacy of sympathy can by itself account for alterity. First, I will lay 
out the rationale underlying the distinction between operative and thetic 
intentionality, on the one hand, and that between primordial pre-
communicative sympathy in children and the adult sympathy of love, on 
the other hand. Secondly, I will turn to Merleau-Ponty's commentary on 
Wallon's study of the mirror-stage of childhood development in which the 
former argues that the attitude of primordial sympathy and not desire or 
jealousy constitutes the operative condition of the possibility of adult 
relations.2 
2 Henri Wallon, Les Origenes du caractere chez Venfant, 2nd ed. (Paris, 
1949). Cf. Jacques Lacan's psychoanalytical reading of the mirror-image of 
the child development in his commentary on Wallon (tcrits: A Selection, 
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Thirdly, I will confront Merleau-Ponty with the following question: 
Given the ontological primacy of sympathy in human ontogenesis, in what 
sense is it legitimate to speak of its ethical primacy in adult intersub-
jectivity? How does his argument from operative intentionality and pre-
communicative sympathy contribute to the possibility of communicative 
and existential ethics? 
I. INTENTIONALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ALTERTTY 
Husserl's clue to the primacy of operative, fungierende inten-
tionality over reflective, thematic consciousness becomes the vehicle of 
Merleau-Ponty's philosophical argument for the primacy of sympathy 
over the role of constituting intentionality in founding and sustaining 
alterity.3 
In our opinion Husserl's originality lies beyond the 
notion of intentionality; it is to be found in the 
elaboration of this notion and in the discovery, beneath 
the intentionality of representations, of a deeper 
intentionality, which others have called existence. (PP 
121, n. 5) 
Merleau-Ponty differentiates the thematic intentionality of acts or of 
understanding from operative intentionality. The former notion of 
intentionality relates to the world cognitively and in that sense exhibits 
thematic and constitutive consciousness. The latter as existential and not 
conceptual or objectifying carries my embodied meaning, my incarnation. 
Ricoeur notes that the theorem of operative intentionality has implications 
for the phenomenology of the body. "When asked how it is possible for a 
meaning to exist without being conscious, the phenomenologist replies: its 
mode of being is that of the body, which is neither an ego nor a thing of the 
world."* 
trans. A. Sheridan |New York: W.W. Norton, 1977], pp. 1-7). Merleau-Ponty 
comments both on Wallon's study of the mirror-stage and Lacan's paper. 
3 On fungierende Intentionalit&t, cf. Edmund Husserl, Vorlesungen zur 
PhMnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewufitseins, and Formate und 
transcendentale Logik, cited by Merleau-Ponty, PP 418, n. 1; also Paul 
Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis 
Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), pp. 375-418 and the index 
for Lacan and Merleau-Ponty. 
4 Ricoeur, Freud, p. 382. Ricoeur questions the ambiguity of Merleau-
Ponty's early treatment of operative intentionality: "What is this 
intentionality which would like to protect itself from the idealistic 
implications of Husserlian phenomenology and which nonetheless 
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Not Husserl but already Descartes and Kant directed the 
attention of modern philosophy to constitutive consciousness and the 
intentionality of acts (PP ix, xvii-xviii, 121, n. 5). The intentionality of acts 
explains that the unity of consciousness is not possible without the simul-
taneous apprehension of the unity of the world.5 All consciousness occurs 
only as consciousness of something. The temporal determination of my 
inner perceptions is bound up by the outer perception of existing things in 
space. I come into being as consciousness only in relation to possible 
intentional objects (PP xvii, 121). Consciousness is conceived of as a 
network of intentional relations between the understanding subject and 
the object. Consciousness is "a pure meaning-giving act" (PP 121). 
Through the thematic acts I know my being in the world as a constituting, 
that is cognitive, relation of my conscious subjectivity to the intentional 
object. A methodology of reduction which only works out of the theorem of 
thematic intentionality must remain within the philosophy of conscious-
ness, which is to say, a subject-centered phenomenology. 
Merleau-Ponty does not jettison reflective phenomenology and 
the acts of thetic intentionality. Nevertheless, he limits his inquiry to the 
conditions of the possibility of thetic, constituting consciousness. In fair-
ness to him, we should not interpret the ontological concerns in his 
phenomenological project as a denial of critical philosophy but rather as 
an exploration of the implicit presuppositions of phenomenology, of the 
ambiguity in phenomenological foundations.6 His inquiry into the condi-
tions of the possibility of one's cognitive relation to the world leads him to 
remains dependent on a philosophy of consciousness and of the subject? 
What is this world which we do not constitute as reflective consciousness 
but which we indeed seem to project as a tacit or bodily cogito?" [Foreword 
in Gary B. Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty (Athens, Ohio: 
Ohio University Press, 1981), p. xv.l 
5 Cf. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New 
York: St. Martin's P, 1965), "Refutation of Idealism" and Preface B. 
6 There is another question about the thesis of the primacy of sympathy 
which I address in the sequel to this paper (cf. * below): Can archeology of 
operative intentionality be foundation of a sufficiently critical 
phenomenology? Does Merleau-Ponty offer a hermeneutic of suspicion 
cognizant of the difference between an ambiguity of phenomenological 
reduction and an ambivalence of the unconscious? Cf. James L. Marsh, 
"Dialectical Phenomenology: From Suspension to Suspicion," Man and 
World 17 (1984): 121-41 and Post-Cartesian Meditations: An Essay In 
Dialectical Phenomenology (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988); 
cf. my review-article of Marsh Transcendental-Phenomenological 
Retrieval and Critical Theory" in Method: Journal of Lonergan Studies 
(March 1990): 94-105. Madison, The Phenomenology, p. 164; Ricoeur, 
Freud, passim. 
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Husserl's clue about operative intentionality. Operative intentionality and 
temporality must be the prius of all cognitive comportment in the world 
(PP 418). According to the deeper (PP121), broadened (PP xviii), new (PP . 
243) and true (PP 446) notion of intentionality, the unity of the world is not 
primarily posited or constituted cognitively but originates in a lived, ante-
predicative and existential unity. 
In arguing for the primacy of operative intentionality which 
founds the cognitive judgment of perception, Merleau-Ponty critiques 
idealism for privileging thetic truth over one's existential being-in-the-
world (PP 418, ix, xii-xiii, xvii-xviii). In his polemic against idealism and 
empiricism, he strives for a descriptive non-duality. But the thesis of the 
primacy of latent, pre-reflective intentionality is not a new form of longing 
for the noumenal, the pre-reflective in-itself, characteristic of idealism. 
This thesis suggests that my life world which pivots back and forth between 
the pre-reflective as such and the constitutive acts of knowledge and 
deliberation is the originator of the derived thematic distinction between 
my constitutive subjectivity and intentional objects. Merleau-Ponty does 
not jettison the proper use of the philosophical distinction between the 
thematic and the operative but assumes concrete posture within the life 
world which allows one to make this distinction legitimately. Idealist and 
empiricist points of departure neglect, truncate and alienate my lived and 
embodied existence. Operative intentionality, he argues, is a primary and 
founding dimension of one's being-in-the-world; although not an absolute 
foundation (we take it up as an already founded existence) it is originary 
"in the sense that the originated is presented as a determinate or explicit 
form of the originator, which prevents the latter from reabsorbing the 
former..." (PP 394). In his later work, Merleau-Ponty preserves the two-
term intentionality analysis but grounds the distinction not in the life world 
but within a non-dualistic ontology of Being. 
The limit discovered in attempting Husserl's phenomenological 
reduction, i.e. that we never have apodictic knowledge, implies for 
Merleau-Ponty not only the primacy of operative over thetic intentionality 
but also the primacy of ontology over phenomenology: an explicit inten-
tionality of cognitive acts presupposes an implicit "intentionality within 
being" (VI 244)7 Phenomenology requires an ontology; this requirement 
becomes fully explicit only in the later Merleau-Ponty.8 His argument 
from operative intentionality suggests that there is an implicit ontology in 
his early work. 9 Since existential phenomenology already implies an 
7 Merleau-Ponty argues for the impossibility of complete reduction also in 
the context of affective appropriation of the specular image in childhood 
development. Cf. II below. 
8 VI140,175-76,200,231,238-39,243-44,254,267,270. 
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ontology, he argues also in his social phenomenology for the ontological 
primacy of primordial sympathy over the thetic and deliberate human 
relationships. 
The two notions of intentionality bear directly on the paradox of 
alterity (PP xii). Just as Merleau-Ponty's overall phenomenological 
argument is for the founding function of operative intentionality over 
cognitive intentionality, so also here he reasons for the affective and epis-
temological primacy of primordial sympathy over the dialectic of 
sympathy and antipathy in deliberate acts. The thesis of the primacy of 
sympathy has an ontological precedence over the developmentally later 
dialectic of alienating gazes. Just as the phenomenology of perception 
begins with a rigorous descriptive account of experience which founds our 
thetic grasp of the lived world, so also the phenomenology of sympathy 
situates itself within the conditions of the possibility of thematically and 
deliberately being sympathetic or antipathetic to others in adult relations 
(PP 425).!° He considers as derivative any phenomenology which takes its 
beginning from constitutive consciousness or its affective equivalent, 
namely the master-slave desire of recognition. Just as thetic 
consciousness is only a founded and thus derived term understandable 
merely on the background of the pre-thematic primacy of perception, so 
also the dialectics of desire are for him derivative modes of intersubjec-
tivity—intelligible because of the primacy of pre-personal sympathy. 
Here a distinction must be drawn between the primordial, pre-
communicative sympathy of syncretic sociability in childhood and the 
adult sympathy of love. Only love is "a genuine sympathy" because the 
adult me, while remaining distinct from the adult alter, is capable of 
deliberately transgressing the known limits of identities (RO in PoP 120). 
Adult sympathy can never be a simple return to childhood; what separates 
the adult me from the primordial me is an intervening and decisive 
differentiation of ego-identity and alterity. 'The initial sympathy rests on 
the ignorance of oneself rather than on the perception of others, while 
adult sympathy occurs between "other" and "other"; it does not abolish the 
differences between myself and the other"(ibid.). It is obvious that 
Merleau-Ponty is not arguing for the primacy of love in same manner as 
he argues for the primacy of primordial sympathy: while primordial 
9 "...in order to see the world and grasp it as paradoxical, we must break 
with our familiar acceptance of it. . . from this break we can learn nothing 
but the unmotivated upsurge of the world (later: the upsurge of Being). 
The most important lesson which the reduction [phenomenological self-
appropriation] teaches us is the impossibility of a complete reduction" (PP 
xiv). 
1 ° Cf. Ricoeur, Freud, pp. 386ff. I am articulating Merleau-Ponty's 
argument for the primacy of sympathy as the condition of the possibility of 
even the fall into antipathy. 
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sympathy, as a theory of human intersubjective nature, is the condition of 
the possibility and impossibility of love, sympathy has solely an imperative 
and ethical but not ontological primacy over the failure to love. 
To sum up: if we take Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of love as 
a clue to his position on alterity, then we can safely conclude that he offers 
neither a causal explanation of adult maturity nor an alternative cognitive 
explanation (RO in PoP 96f.). The thesis of the primacy of sympathy does 
not privilege 'innocent' childhood over adult forms of interaction. The 
operative intentionality organizes both the world of the child and of the 
adult. 
In his argument for the primacy of perception and sympathy, 
Merleau-Ponty returns to the paradox of intersubjectivity in Husserl's 
Cartesian Meditations (V, par. 44,55,56) : How can I constitute myself and 
the alter in me? In this reappropriation of the paradox he addresses 
Husserl's thesis in The Crisis of European Sciences, that "[tjranscendental 
subjectivity is a revealed subjectivity, revealed to itself and to others, and is 
for that reason an intersubjectivity" (PP 361, xiii). The problem of the 
experience of others appears because I must account for the possibility of 
four perspectives-my view of myself and the alter's of herself, my view of 
the alter and her of me-in order to explicate genuine alterity (PP xii, 373, 
432,448, PoP 115f.). Either the other is a constituting consciousness, and I 
myself am neither a constituting consciousness nor a subject for myself; or 
I constitute the alter, and thus he is not himself a constituting subject and 
not a true alter-ego. The paradox of constitution is that both the ego and 
the alter figure under the perspective of the for oneself and of the for 
others, but these cannot be arbitrarily juxtaposed. 
Merleau-Ponty does not object to the distinction between 
operative and thematic consciousness, between primordial and deliberate 
sympathy. The distinction is fine as it stands, but it is useless in what 
Merleau-Ponty sets out to investigate. We should not infer that he judges 
all objectification, pertaining to the thematic intentionality of acts and to 
the deliberate posture towards the alter, as self-alienating or violent 
against the other. He offers different reasons for the shift in the manner of 
his analysis: he argues against constitutive consciousness as that level on 
which phenomenological analysis ought to focus. Because of the failure to 
account for the primacy of perception and of sympathy, idealists and 
empiricists have truncated, neglected and alienated the life-world as the 
sole theater of self-identity and alterity. Merleau-Ponty shifts the level of 
inquiry from constitutive consciousness to an 'archeology' of a pre-
thematic, operative field of intersubjectivity.^ 
11 Cf. Bernard Lonergan, The Subject (Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 1968); 
Collection, Vol. 4 of Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: U of 
Toronto P, 1988), p. 21 Iff. and Marsh's Post-Cartesian Meditations, chap, 
on objectivity. 
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Before thematizing the difference between alienation (e.g. in 
jealousy) and legitimate objectification (e.g. in greeting), he inquires into 
the conditions of the possibility of non-alienating objectification. 
I must be the exterior that I present to others, and the 
body of the other must be the other himself. This 
paradox and the dialectic of the Ego and the Alter are 
possible only provided that the Ego and the Alter Ego are 
defined by their situation... that at the very moment when 
I experience my existence—at the ultimate extremity of 
reflection-I fall short of the ultimate density which would 
place me outside time, and that I discover within myself 
a kind of internal weakness standing in the way of my 
being totally individualized... (PPxii). 
This 'internal weakness' betrays the pre-existing intersubjective bond of 
operative intentionality, i.e. primordial sympathy, that defines and founds 
both the for-oneself and the for-othera. 
(I]n sympathy...I can perceive another as bare existence 
and freedom as much or as little as myself. The-other-
as-object is nothing but an insincere modality of others, 
just as absolute subjectivity is nothing but an abstract 
notion of myself. I must... in the most radical reflection, 
apprehend around my absolute individuality a kind of 
halo of generality or a kind of atmosphere of 
'sociality'....My life must have a significance which I do 
not constitute. (PP 448) 
Sympathy, love, lived existence in the world all express the instituted, her-
meneutically given significance which I do not constitute; they form my 
ego-identity and a field in which I can thematically and deliberately take 
up relations with the other. For Merleau-Ponty, the paradox of 
intersubjectivity can be resolved only in the shift of analysis from the 
abstract subject as object and corresponding derived modalities of alterity 
to an existential concretion of the subject as subject and its corresponding 
phenomenology of primordial sympathy. 
II. THE THESIS OF THE PRIMACY OF SYMPATHY 
We have seen how the paradox of intersubjectivity appeared to a 
representational consciousness. 1 can't represent to myself how my alter 
feels her body; she can't represent herself in the same manner in which 1 
constitute myself (RO in PoP 114). To account for the genuine foundation 
of inwardness and alterity, Merleau-Ponty reformulates the function of 
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imitation, mimesis, in non-representational terms. T o imitate is to 
perform a gesture in the image of another gesture..." (RO in PoP 116). The 
phenomenology of sympathy explains how the ego takes up the postural 
and embodied attitude of the alter through non-representational mimesis 
of gestures. Mimesis is "that attitude whereby I assume the gestures, the 
conducts, the favorite words, the ways of doing things of those whom I 
confront" (RO in PoP 145). We can substitute our posture for that of the 
alter through gestures because the body carries the competence for 
"meditation," i.e. "the inward formulation of gestures" (RO in PoP 146). In 
mimesis one lives the gap between the inner and outer, inwardness and 
alterity. Mimesis is the correspondence between my perception of the 
alter and my motor behavior. But the transfer of the attitude of another to 
me is not a simple analogy (PP 352). 
My "psyche" is not a series of "states of consciousness" 
that are rigorously closed in on themselves and 
inaccessible to anyone but me. My consciousness is 
turned primarily toward the world, turned toward things; 
it is above all a relation to the world.... Thus it is in...the 
manner in which the other deals with the world, that I will 
be able to discover his consciousness (RO in PoP 116-17). 
Just as my consciousness of my own body is a corporeal, postural scheme, 
so also taking the attitude of the alter involves primarily a transfer of body-
intentions. What is transferred mimetically are not the representations of 
the alter through constitutive consciousness but a pre-communicative 
level of intersubjectivity.1 ^  M[T]he other's intentions somehow play across 
my body while my intentions play across his" (RO in PoP 119). Merleau-
Ponty concludes that we can't account for alterity if the ego and the alter 
claim "an absolute originality in relation to the other that confronts it" 
(ibid.). Pie-communication is not yet communicative and existential ethics 
but it explicates how I can live my intentions in the gestures and facial 
expressions of others and their will in my body. 
To give an example of non-thematic mimesis: a phenomenology 
of the smile is at once a phenomenology of perception and of sympathy. 
When I smile, "...I live in the facial expressions of the other, as I feel him 
living in mine" (RO in PoP 146.). According to the combined thesis of the 
primacy of perception and sympathy, perceptual consciousness founds my 
cognitive and deliberate self-appropriation and my comportment to the 
world and the alter. Yes, the smile is perceived, but the perceived smile 
12 Merleau-Ponty reinterprets not only mimesis but also Husserl's pairing 
or coupling and intentional transgression. "In perceiving the other, my 
body and his are coupled, resulting in a sort of action which pairs them" 
(PoP 118). Cf. HI below. 
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need not be necessarily known as a thetic act of deliberate sympathy. It is 
cognitively apprehended only when one lover smiles at the other to 
communicate love or when the alter refuses to smile back. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that humans emerge from anonymous 
collectivity into a segregation of individuals; but segregation is never a fully 
completed process. Because, as a child, I begin in an ambiguous situation 
in which I know neither myself nor the alter, but live in both, I carry my 
"primordial me" as my inward weakness into adulthood (ibid., PP xii). My 
primordial weakness is neither egocentrism (Cartesian anxiety is not one's 
originary problem) nor the desire to be desired (the struggle for recogni-
tion is not my first dilemma) but rather syncretic sociability. 
Merleau-Ponty carries out this argument, first, in what we have 
followed in the thesis of the primacy of perception as a critique of idealism 
and empiricism. Secondly, he argues by offering counterproofs from the 
cases of developmental pathologies. These strategies show how operative 
intentionality and primordial sympathy are presupposed in human 
desires, in thetic acts and in deliberate struggles for recognition. Primor-
dial sympathy or syncretic sociability is his philosophical figure of 
operative intentionality when it comes to the treatment of alterity. 1 will 
follow with an example. 
The pathological case of Schneider does negatively certify the 
thesis of the primacy of perception and sympathy. In his failure, 
Schneider fits the idealist and the empiricist accounts of our comportment 
toward others and to the world; if the idealist and the empiricist 
epistemologies are the measure of truth, then the world is as Schneider 
perceives and constitutes it. His problem is that he lacks operative 
intentionality and can neither pattern and live through his actions nor find 
unity in the world (PP 109,133,136,179,187,282). Does he suffer from the 
Cartesian or the Humean disease on the level of constitutive 
consciousness and sensing? Is he the slave of passions? No, he suffers 
from damage in motoric and gestural competencies. He can't coordinate 
through non-representational mimesis his motor activity with posture and 
the gestural dimension of expressivity. He can't live in his speech because 
of the breakdown on the level of primordial sympathy. He lacks the 
"intentional arc" which grounds all conceptual and thetic unity (PP 136). 
Because he does not suffer the Cartesian or the Humean predicament, 
but only appears to uphold the epistemological antinomies of idealism 
and empiricism, his case functions as a counter-proof for the thesis of the 
primacy of perception and the primacy of sympathy. 
The above example of Merleau-Ponty's manner of proceeding in 
no manner implies a reduction of the thematic intentionality of acts, and 
of adulthood, to operative sympathy in children. His concern isn't that 
there is something wrong with constitutive consciousness. Schneider's 
case demonstrates that operative intentionality and sympathy are the 
conditions of the possibility of constitutive intersubjective existence. 
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Merleau-Ponty can argue for the primacy of primordial sympathy without 
illegitimately privileging the child because he supports his case against 
idealism and empiricism by developmental studies and at the same time 
offers counterproofs from an existential analysis of adult pathologies. 
Rather than multiplying his explanatory categories, he utilizes the 
argument from operative intentionality across the board: 
ITlhe life of consciousness-cognitive life, the life of 
desire or perceptual life-is subtended by an 'intentional 
arc' which projects round about us our past, our future, 
our human setting, our physical, ideological and moral 
situation, or rather which results in our being situated in 
all these respects. It is this intentional arc which brings 
the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and 
motility. And it is this which 'goes limp' in illness (PP 136). 
It is within Merleau-Ponty's focus on the primacy of operative 
sympathy that we need to set his interpretation of the specular drama of 
the differentiation between the 'primordial me' and the alter. Only thus we 
can purchase some understanding on why the phenomenology of 
sympathy takes precedence over the dialectic of desire in his model of 
alterity. 
Even though the child's consciousness of its own body develops 
prior to the perception of the alter, the child is unable to privilege itself 
over the alter (RO in PoP 120). A six month old child will begin to explore 
one hand with the other (RO in PoP 123). These explorations allow for the 
initial differentiation between the interoceptive and the exteroceptive 
senses of one's body, between the touched and touching. Likewise first 
reactions to the alter are not visual but are shot through with the child's 
own introceptive data (RO in PoP 124f.). The child's own hand appears 
equally as foreign as that of the alter. 
Research shows that there is a difference between animals and 
children in their reactions to the specular image of their own body in the 
mirror. A duck whose mate dies sits in front of a window pane where his 
specular image simulates the lost mate. The image is for the duck the lost 
animal, and the duck completes himself via this supplement, an imprint in 
the pane (RO in PoP 126). In the same fashion dogs react with fear to their 
own mirror-image and will not grasp its symbolic function. Similarly 
chimpanzees fail to acquire the symbolic meaning of the mirror-image as 
their image. A chimpanzee might pass his 'hand' behind the mirror and 
be 'disappointed' that there is nothing behind it, but he doesn't recognize 
himself in the mirror (RO in PoP 127). The six month old child, unlike the 
animal, will go through a process of differentiation of his own specular 
image from others. An eight month old child will act surprised when she 
sees herself in the mirror, but she does not yet possess the symbolic notion 
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of her specular image. It is harder for the ego to grasp its own specular 
image before the mirror-image of the alter. The child can recognize the 
father in a mirror and smile at his image. The phenomenology of the 
smile, based on the thesis of the primacy of sympathy, can account for this 
incident. But even here the child does not thematically constitute this 
image as a symbol of the father. When the father speaks, the child turns 
from the mirror-image of the father to him and is astonished. 
Why is it more difficult to apprehend one's own specular image 
than the one of the alter? Why does anonymous alterity precede a 
genuine differentiation of the ego from the alter? Merleau-Ponty argues, 
first, that the mirror is the only locus where I can initially see my own body 
as a totality; but I take myself as being here where I locate myself 
interoceptively (RO in PoP 129). Now the mirror locates me neither 
interoceptively nor exteroceptively-as when my right hand touches my left 
hand. Secondly, I can be seen, on the one hand, only where 1 also feel 
myself interoceptively. But, on the other hand, only in the mirror can I see 
myself as a whole. I must reconcile this paradox through a displacement 
of the mirror-image, "bringing it from the apparent or virtual place it 
occupies in the depths of the mirror back to. . . (myselfl whom... (I) identify 
at a distance with ... [my] introceptive body" (RO in PoP 129). The child 
facing his mirror-image finds himself doubled; he believes that his 
specular image, unlike the image of his parent, is his real double (ibid.). 
To sum up: the human developmental process follows the reverse 
course of the Cartesian articulation of beginnings; my self-certainty of 
myself is the least and last of my certitudes. In one year the child emerges 
from a pre-communicative stage of non-differentiation into the specular 
world. She learns, first, to differentiate the parental image from the actual 
parent and, later, the specular image of herself from her actual self. But 
this latter step requires the reduction of the specular image, which the 
child takes for her real double, into the symbolic function of the specular 
image (RO in PoP 133). Merleau-Ponty shows the impossibility of a 
complete reduction of the specular image to the general conceptual level 
(RO in PoP 133). The specular drama reveals the ontological, if not a 
psychoanalytical, limit of Husserl's phenomenological reduction (PP xiv). 
The reduction of the mirror-image occurs not primarily as thematic and 
deliberate phenomenon; rather I acquire this reduction through a lived 
experience, sympathetic co-existence with others. The reduction means 
that child must return the specular image of herself to her body. Through 
an ideal notion of space she has to reduce that space which clings to the 
specular image and return it to her own introceptive sense of the corporeal 
posture But the child's apprehension of the mirror-image isn't fully 
reduced to the conceptual and symbolic meaning it later assumes under 
the ideal form of space. In this lived inter-world, we don't have yet a pure 
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egology or sociology of intersubjective selfhood.13 Existential analysis only 
clarifies the operative conditions of the possibility of perception, desire, 
self-identity and alterity. 
Merleau-Ponty dissents from Wallon (Kant and early Husserl) 
who considers the act of reduction of the specular image as primarily a 
work of the intellect and from Lacan who explicates the role of the mirror-
image through one's unconscious identification with the alter (RO in PoP 
139). Merleau-Ponty denies that cognitive reduction and the 
psychoanalyses of desire are fully explanatory of intersubjectivity. He 
takes the constituting function of thetic intentionality and conflictual 
relations, like jealousy, to be results of the development beyond syncretic 
sociability. Against Wallon and Lacan, he argues that we actually perceive 
ourselves in two different places. With Lacan, he agrees that affective 
significance is more significant than cognitive reduction in development of 
self-identity and intersubjective relations. Reduction of the specular 
image is not primarily a thetic act but "a synthesis of coexistence with 
others" (RO in PoP 140). This original sympathy with others, "the relation of 
'reciprocity'" stands for what we call intelligence (ibid.). The "ubiquity of 
the body" which the child has to tackle in its confrontation with the 
specular double is the ground where alterity must be worked out (RO in 
PoP 139). 
The child's problem is not so much one of understanding 
that the visual and the tactile images of the body—both 
located in two points in space—in reality comprise only 
one, as it is of understanding that the image in the mirror 
is his image, that it is what others see of him, the 
appearance he presents to other subjects.... (RO in PoP 
140) 
This ubiquity of the body is not strictly real but only intentional 
(PP 331). But why are adults amused by the presence of "a quasi intention" 
when they see themselves in a mirror, a photograph or a painting (RO in 
PoP 132)? Walton's cognitive reduction and simple socialization of the 
specular drama explains neither our mature adult behavior nor 
pathologies. One's image retains the halo of sacred presence, the quasi-
presence of one's person even for the adult. In my mature adult self-
relation, I can reflect and analyze my image which was hastily drawn as a 
sketch by a Montmartre street artist. I am not this sketch. But I can find 
13 Cf. John O'Neill "The Specular Body: Merleau-Ponty and Lacan on 
Infant Self and Other" Synthase 66 (Fall 86), p. 204: "Yet it is only from this 
ground of anonymous intersubjectivity—not yet ego, not yet alter—that he 
can experience the generics of a bodily and personal self in a world 
similarly incorporated." 
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myself animated by the real resemblance which asks for my belief, I can 
be amused (RO in PoP 132). I cling to the sketch even though I 'know' that 
it is not really me. The sketch is not very good. It's kitsch. But my friend 
might hesitate to step on it. Stepping on my imaged-face would involve 
her in an act of aggression. We are two adults and not Wallon's or Lacan's 
or Merleau-Ponty's experimental babies. But we can't simply shake off 
the sense that the sketch is not just a reflection of the incarnate me. I can 
suspend the sketch-image at a distance, but my reflective and analytical 
thematization will not be a clear-cut reduction (RO in PoP 133). 
Even though the mirror-image loses its spatiality when the child 
reaches one year, the impossibility of a total reduction of the specular 
drama surfaces when symbolic and constitutive consciousness is in 
difficulty. Pathological cases reveal the nature of the child's original belief 
that one can occupy several spaces at once (RO in PoP 129). We find this 
notion in dreams, in hypnosis, in dying and drowning people. Apraxics 
cannot spatially co-ordinate their movements with objects before the 
mirror; also their function of mimesis is disturbed in simple imitation of 
the alter's movements in front of them (RO in PoP 130). If the reduction of 
the specular image into one's interoceptive self-identity were complete, if 
in fact thetic intentionality were constitutive of self-identity and alterity, 
then these cases could not be used as counterproofs. 
In the commentary on Wallon's study of infants' reactions to their 
mirror-image, Merleau-Ponty does not argue for a return to the childhood 
world but for a paradigm of adult maturity (RO in PoP 154f.). In the last two 
pages of his commentary, Merleau-Ponty discusses freedom in the context 
of adult loving (also PP 378,381,434ff). T o love is inevitably to enter into an 
undivided situation with another" (RO in PoP 154). In love I am torn away 
from my solitude and become mutually mediated with the alter. "(TJo be 
joined with someone else is...to live her life, at least in intention. To the 
very extent that it is convincing and genuine, the experience of the other is 
necessarily an alienating one" (ibid.). This sense of 'alienation' is evoked 
by risk, insecurity and doubt because in love there occurs a legitimate 
dispossession of the ego by the alter. The counter-example is an adult or a 
child who desires clear and distinct proofs of the other's affection: the adult 
only imprisons his desire to be desired by the alter in his absolute lone ego 
and the alter in the immediacy of desire (RO in PoP155). 
Because the demand of proof represents the want of a total 
reduction of the other to an object, this illegitimate dispossession fails not 
only loving and dialogue but also freedom. Here Cartesianism and die-
hard empiricism betray all lovers. Whereas love dispossesses the ego for 
the sake of preserving alterity of the loved one, the attitude of sheer desire 
is fueled by violence towards itself and the alter. The lack of generosity 
and trust surfaces in every desire for a world free from risk. 
Since there are no Cartesian or empiricist proofs of love apart 
from lived experience, love and reciprocal discourse heighten this risk to 
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self-identity. The risk discloses an 'internal weakness' (PP xii) and 
insecurity within one's incomplete individuation. Just as the primacy of 
perception is Merleau-Ponty's "remedy to skepticism and pessimism/ so 
also with the thesis of the primacy of sympathy he denies the Sartrean 
verdict that human sympathy is an illusion. 
If . . 3 8 the primacy of perception requires, we call what we 
perceive "the world," and what we love "the. person," 
there is a type of doubt concerning man, and a type of 
spite, which becomes impossible.... We weight the 
hardihood of the love which promises beyond what it 
knows, which claims to be eternal when a sickness, 
perhaps an accident, will destroy it... But it is true, at the 
moment of this promise, that our love extends beyond 
qualities, beyond the body, beyond time, even though we 
could not love without qualities, bodies, and time. (PrP in 
PoP 26-27; cf. AD 142 and ch. 5) 
And here surfaces the clue which unifies Merleau-Ponty's 
developmental argument against idealism and empiricism with the 
counterproofs from pathologies and which, when the three developmental 
stages are kept distinct, would provide a condition for the possibility of a 
communicative and existential ethic: since I am from birth disempowered, 
and because this original sympathy is never fully suppressed in individua-
tion, the realms of affectivity and pathology can bring about regression 
from "selfless" adult love to the real loss of identity and the failure in 
sustaining genuine intersubjectivity (RO in PoP 155). If love is Merleau-
Ponty's paradigm of adult sympathy, then we can understand why he also 
chose Walton's study of child sympathy—and not as did Lacan, Wallon's 
account of jealousy—as the founding term of self-identity and alterity. The 
attitude of primordial sympathy presupposes the affective equilibrium of 
reciprocity and equality. Reciprocity is thematically recovered in an 
equilibrium of a dialogue and deliberately won in loving. 
The identification of the child with its specular image parallels 
similar identification with others (RO in PoP 135). Because the reduction 
of the specular stage of human development never results in the 
intellectual and affective differentiation of my visual body from my 
introceptive body, sympathy in syncretic sociability of children founds 
epistemology, affectivity, and allows for the ethic of love and dialogue. The 
adult reappropriation of sympathy remains the founded pole, while 
primordial sympathy plays the affective-epistemological role parallel to 
the founding function of perception in acts of cognition. The affective 
significance of our interest in the specular image is, thus, the key to 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of love and dialogue (RO in PoP 137). 
The belief of the child that the mirror-image is its double never wholly 
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leaves the adult. The child's affective tie to the specular drama enters 
operative intentionality as it functions in adult cognition and deliberation 
(RO in PoP 138). A total reduction of the specular-ego would be possible 
only if human relations were free of emotional risks. But risk-free love and 
dialogue constitute a fiction imagined by thetic cogito. "[SJince the image-
reflection is unstable, the operations that constitute it involve not only the 
intelligence proper but, rather, all the individual's relations with others" 
(ibid.). 
To illustrate: the case of 'transitivism' reflects how an indistinction 
between the ego and the alter which is typical in the syncretic sociability of 
children can reappear in adult relations of love and in pathologies. 
Transitivism represents a loss of relative equilibrium between ego-identity 
and alterity. It consists "in attributing to others what belongs to the 
subject" (RO in PoP 148). What happens to us influences our view of 
others. Children often impute their own attitudes to the alter. In cases of 
transitivism, two personalities of children can become wholly non-
differentiated (RO in PoP 149). Their perspectives in space and time, the 
apprehension of the relations between words and things, symbols and the 
model, the inner and the outer likewise remain indistinct. The child can 
identify different parts of the body but will not differentiate between its 
own hand and that of the alter. Picasso's cubist art and Derrida's 
deconstructed being-in-the-world will be more immediately accepted by 
the child than by the adult, because these notions have the character of 
the child's world (RO in PoP 150). If sympathy in the stage of syncretic 
sociability manifests indistinctness between the self and the alter, then an 
adult love threatens a relapse to such non-differentiation. This threat 
delivers good suffering; the pathos of suffering retains the promise that 
sympathy is possible, that internal weakness which binds me to others can 
be reappropriated ethically. 
The crisis at three years" can't affect the differentiation of the self 
and the alter through the total reduction of syncretic sociability. This crisis 
sets the stage for adult love and hatred. Around the age of three, the child 
begins to adopt his own stance towards others and the world. Only now 
begins the saga of Sartre's dialectic of alienating gazes: the child changes 
his reactions to alter's gaze (RO in PoP 152f.). Merleau-Ponty argues that 
love is not exemplified by mutual attempts at capturing the freedom of the 
alter.l 4 During the crisis at three the ego doubles itself with an "ego in the 
eyes of the other" (RO in PoP 153). The child is annoyed and disturbed in 
his activity by the alien gaze. The child finds himself to be also what others 
14 Cf. Mary Rose Barral, Merleau-Ponty: The Role of the Body-Subject in 
Interpersonal Relations (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1965), p. 160f. "Self and 
Other: Communication and Love," Review of Existential Psychology and 
Psychiatry XVIII, 1,2 & 3 (1982-83): 155-180. 
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see of him. The crisis results in the distanciation of syncretism and the 
generalization of the specular image. 
Merleau-Ponty argues that we meet the primordial sense of 
sympathy and even transitivism during adulthood (RO in PoP 154). 
Specific limiting situations in adult life will evoke the latent indistinction 
between the self and the alter. The fright of insecurity reoccurs not only 
within Cartesian anxiety but inevitably in love and dialogue. The age of 
three does not resolve the risks which mature relations solidt. Transitiv-
ism, which has been surpassed in the realm of immediate daily life, is 
never surpassed in the realm of feelings" (RO in PoP 155). 
We should note what is important in Merleau-Ponty's analysis. 
The first three years of human development set the original theater for 
adult love and conflict. The internal weakness of primordial sympathy 
can't be apodictically overcome. The ontology of sympathy stipulates that 
I can be reconciled to that interior tie which bonds me with the alter 
without pathology and overt conflict. The phenomenology of love and 
dialogue argues that I ought to take up my primordial weakness and make 
it the strength of my adult relationships. The phenomenology of sympathy 
does not privilege the child, nor does it explain adult behavior by 
pathologies. The cases are used as counter-factuals which depict 
operative intentionality and sympathy as the horizon and the conditions of 
thematic intentionality in sustaining self-identity and alterity. 
III. TOWARDS A COMMUNICATIVE AND EXISTENTIAL ETHIC 
Just as Merleau-Ponty never wrote a phenomenology of 
sympathy, so also he did not develop a moral theory and an existential 
ethic. The following reconstruction is my programmatic proposal. 
We must inquire whether and how the reappropriation of pri-
mordial affect of sympathy becomes justified in deliberate human 
relations. My distinction of the three developmental stages suggests that 
the cognitive and normative character of dialogic reciprocity can be 
conceived neither as a regression to nor an extension of affective 
sympathy. Affects are necessary but not sufficient as rational and 
existential grounds. Affective solidarity of lifeworld provides a resource of 
individual and group identities and the pool of background assumptions. 
Life-world contains a communitarian perspective but sustains, on its own, 
neither the normatively moral point of view nor a decisively responsible 
living. Given the affective, lifeworld primacy of sympathy in human 
ontogenesis and adult relations, in what sense can we speak of its moral 
and existential primacy? 
I sketch three steps in which Merleau-Ponty's reply could be 
reconstructed: 1 / The disempowerment of the ego provides the 
descriptive, hermeneutic, and rational justification for the form of 
communicative and the mode of existential ethics. Morality and 
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existential ethic are to compensate for vulnerable, decentered human 
identity. This compensation for affective risks in the core of identity-
formation stabilizes intersubjectivity on normative justice and concrete 
solidarity. 2/ Merleau-Ponty's critique of terror and of the Communist 
Party cannot but assume a counterfactual form of life, the ideal 
communication community, on the one hand, and non-authoritarian, 
open, and unrepressed existential identity on the other. 3 / The dialectic of 
discourse and power does not sustain postmodern evidence for the 
ubiquity of power in lifeworld and identity-formation.^^ 
1. Let me read Merleau-Ponty's view of mimesis and 
phenomenological contribution to communicative and existential ethics 
against Horkheimer's and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
The ratio which supplants mimesis is not simply its 
counterpart. It is itself mimesis: mimesis unto death. 
The subjective spirit which cancels the animation of 
nature can master a despiritualized nature only by 
imitating its rigidity and despiritualizing itself in return.... 
Men had to do fearful things to themselves before the 
self, the identical, purposive, and virile nature of man, 
was formed, and something of that recurs in every 
childhood.16 
Adorno's mimetic logic, under the figure of homeless Odysseus, depicts 
both human ontogenesis and rational life-forms in the service of 
repression of inner and oppression of outer nature. The conquest of outer 
nature already despiritualizes human inner nature. Rational forms of life 
do not sustain embodied intersubjectivity but imitate the dead outer 
nature. Human development is an iron cage of self-destructive identity, a 
development unto death. If there be any positive role for critique, then it 
could employ conceptuality only paradoxically as a negative dialectic. If 
there be any emancipation, then it must be postponed to the aesthetic 
other of ratio. Because Adorno's critique is normatively unjustified, his 
aesthetic Utopia of unrepressed non-identity is performatively self-
contradictory: Adorno uses experience, understanding, and judgment to 
15 Cf. another reconstruction by Kerry H. Whiteside, Merleau-Ponty and 
the Foundation of an Existential Politics (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1988). In 
ch. 10. Whiteside compares Merleau-Ponty with Michael Walzer, John 
Rawls, and Michel Foucault. 
16 Max Horkheimer /Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. 
John Dimming (New York: Continuum, 1987), pp. 57,33. 
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undermine the descriptive, hermeneutic, and rational evidence of 
claims.17 
Against Adorno's mimetic logic Merleau-Ponty's non-repre-
sentational description of mimesis can be maintained and stabilized in 
post-traditional forms of life on the deliberative basis of autonomous self-
determination and existential self-realization. One, the moral point of view 
compensates for the fragile human identity by appealing to formal 
normative presuppositions: in ongoing discourses, the ideal 
communication conditions of symmetry (reciprocity and equality) between 
the ego and the alter must be fulfilled if validity-claims are rationally 
justified. Two, an existential ethic sustains identity-claims only in relations 
of openness to the concrete other. Thus, universal justice and solidarity in 
the moral point of view and also concrete applications of normative criteria 
presuppose the formal counterfactual conditions of that life-form which 
admits of non-authoritative, open, and unrepressed identity for whose 
fragility morality and existential ethics compensate.^ 
17 Cf. my "Habermas On Communicative Reason and Performative 
Contradiction,** New German Critique 47 (1989): 163-92 and "Jtirgen 
Habermas at 60" Philosophy and Social Criticism (forthcoming). 
18 Cf. Jurgen Habermas, Moralbewufltsein und kommunikatives Handeln 
(Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1983); "Gerechtigkeit und Solidarity 
Eine Stellungnahme zur Diskussion fiber 'Stufe 6,'" in: Wolfgang Edelstein 
and Gertrud Nunner-Winkler, eds., Zur Bestimmung der Moral: 
Philosophische und sozialwissenschaftliche Beitr&ge zur Moralforschung 
(Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), pp. 291-318; "Moralitat und 
Sittlichkeit. Treffen Hegels EinwSnde gegen Kant auch die Diskursethik 
zu?" in: Wolfgang Kuhlmann, ed., Moralitat und Sittlichkeit: Das Problem 
Hegels und die Diskursethik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1986), pp. 16-
37. 
Habermas notes the aporias of Adorno's mimetic logic: for 
Adornp the concept operates as a polarity between object and subject. 
The emancipatory capacity of reason remains hidden. Adorno cannot 
recognize communicative competence as the condition of the possibility of 
critique and emancipation. The polarized logic of inner and outer nature 
shows only objectified functions of language but fails to account for its 
commencement in life-world. Mimesis is the irrational other of rationality. 
In order to effect a unity of mimesis and reason in the basis of language, 
Habermas proposes a paradigm shift. The cultural-social realm is 
constituted both by communicative and objectifying reason, life-world and 
system. The Utopian perspective enters communicative rationality itself. 
Unconstrained intersubjectivity is that counterfactual which can be won by 
communicative reason because of its linguistic nature. (Jurgen 
Habermas, Die Neue UnUbersichtlichkeit [Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp 
Verlag, 1985], "Em Interview mit der New Left Review," esp. p. 221; The 
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Descriptive, hermeneutic, and rational evidence for the possibi-
lity of communicative and existential ethics lies in a lifeworld-notion of 
mimesis as disempowerment of the ego. 
First, descriptive evidence shows that identity claims of the ego 
and the alter are formed through embodied intersubjectivity. Mimesis 
does not represent a development out of the aporias between the inner 
and outer nature. These aporias are only later constructs. The ego and the 
alter qua embodied intersubjectivities are equally and reciprocally 
disempowered. Merleau-Ponty's evidence counters the descriptive 
failures common to Hegel, Adorno, Kojeve, Sartre, Lacan, and Foucault 
that lead these thinkers to various formulations of an ethic based on 
higher-subjectivity, negative dialectic, violence, gaze or nihilation, 
unconscious desire, and disciplinary bio-power.19 
Second, hermeneutic evidence depicts lifeworld as the horizon of 
understanding and freedom. Not only identity-claims but also free will is 
embedded in lifeworld. Merleau-Ponty shows that freedom is neither an 
unmotivated leap nor a determined cause. He situates freedom between 
culture and an existential motivation of the agent. The linguistically of 
lifeworld provides the sedimented meanings for the reproduction of 
cultural, social, and personal interaction. Descriptive and hermeneutic 
evidence thematize embodied intersubjectivity as incarnate in social time 
and historical space. Lifeworld offers cumulative evidence: ego and alter 
are equally and reciprocally disempowered; they can neither objectify 
their linguistically formed identities nor originate life-projects ex nihilo. 
Third, rational evidence is available in discourse. 
Communication inherits but maintains and stabilizes the descriptive and 
hermeneutic evidences of disempowerment. While one attains identity 
only in lifeworld, deliberate identity- and validity-claims originate in a 
public sphere. Rational evidence for the possibility of communicative and 
existential ethics is a judgment of the fact that I cannot know myself 
without the point of view of intersubjectivity. The public sphere of 
dialogue is the stabilizing condition of all truth- and value-claims. While 
hermeneutic evidence provides the communitarian basis of truth and 
objectivity in sedimented meanings, rational evidence is necessary for the 
public defensibility of values 20 
Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick 
Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT P, 19871, lecture V.) 
19 This evidence is an option to postmodernism, a resource for resolving 
what Seyla Benhabib calls feminist identity-crisis. Cf. * below and my 
"Identity and Power: A Contribution to the Debate between 
Postmodernism of M. Foucault and Critical Modernism of J. Habermas," 
FUozoficky casopis, written and published in Czech (Praha: Academy of 
Sciences, forthcoming in 1991). 
20 Cf. Whiteside, Merleau-Ponty, p. 306f. 
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2. Merleau-Ponty's critique of distorted communication 
presupposes fourth type of evidence, i.e. normative counterfactual. Just as 
in his diagnosis of Schneider, so also in his critique of the revolutionary 
terror and of the Communist Party, counterfactual evidence must satisfy 
the objectivity of critique and the plausibility of the proposed cure. 
Merleau-Ponty transforms the meaning of revolutionary violence 
into non-Communist leftism: non-partisan and non-ideological, 
communicative and existential praxis. In his critique of the equivocal 
character of the Communist Party and its authority, he prefigures 
Habermas's communicative ethics (AD 209 ft). He offers a phenomenolo-
gically founded social critique and a critically chastened existential-
phenomenology: "Thus Marxism needs a theory of consciousness which 
accounts for its mystification without denying it participation in truth" (AD 
41,45)21 
The stand-point of social critique remains fallibilist: "Truth itself is 
then conceived as a process of indefinite verification..." (AD 53). Critical 
phenomenology becomes a "permanent interrogation," "the genealogy of 
truth," and an existentially intensified social praxis (AD 57). Critical 
posture embodies "a praxis of a superior degree"—superior to the arbitrary 
revolutionary violence and to the positivism of the Communist Party (AD 
50). Existential and social praxis has hope; but this hope is not a material 
Utopia but a mode of existence. Hope retrieves the conditions of 
reciprocity and equality in ongoing appropriations of mutual love and 
dialogued 
There is a dialectic only in that type of being in which a 
junction of subjects occurs, being is not only a spectacle 
that each subject presents to itself for its own benefit but 
which is rather their common residence, the place of 
their exchange and of their reciprocal interpretation. 
(AD 204) 
Communicative and existential ethics requires—besides the 
descriptive, hermeneutical, and rational evidence for its possibility-also 
the performatively ascertained conditions of symmetry, equality, and 
21 Habermas consoles by "non-Communist leftism" leftists who are 
disenchanted after the November 1989 events in Central Europe (cf. his 
Die nachholende Revolution: Kleine Politische Schriften VII (Frankfurt 
a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990), p 188ff. 
22 Cf. Vaclav Havel's "existential revolution" (cf. his Moc bezmocnych 
IPraha, 1978], in German, Versuch, in der Wahrheit zu leben, trans. Gabriel 
Laub (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1990], chaps 20-22) and my "Vertical Identity as 
a Critique of Power: Kierkegaard, Levinas, and Havel" (presented in Czech, 
Praha: Charles' University, 11 April 1990); cf. section 3 below. 
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reciprocity in discourse. Performative contradiction falsifies this 
requirement. Contradiction occurs when a critic communicates without 
normative evidence and counterfactual basis. It is self-contradiction 
because the critic undermines the conditions that pertain to her own 
existence. The critic uses experience, understanding, judgment, and 
deliberation to jettison all types of evidence. 
Contrary to legitimate postmodern sensitivity to pathological 
modernity, communicative and existential ethics calls not for less but 
more evidential rationality, not for the death of an already disempowered 
identity but for an intensification of one's responsible existence through 
receptivity to the other. Ubiquity of power, totality, and revolutionary terror 
are problems only for the Cartesian, sdentistic, Party- and Frt/irer-oriented 
cogito but not for the self which relates to itself and alter as autonomous 
but disempowered subjectivities. Communicative and existential counter-
factual operates in any will to discourse intensified through experience, 
understanding, judgment, and deliberation vis-a-vis its own powerlessness. 
We are not powerless because I or the alter could not act from the will to 
power. We are disempowered insofar as we will to discourse. 
Four levels of evidence have strength in the phenomenologically 
grounded existential self. Discourse originates, first, in embodied 
intersubjectivity; second, in the cultural, social, and personal lifeworld; 
third, in the publicly formed identity and validity claims; and, fourth, 
through the will oriented to intersubjectivity, lifeworld, and the public 
sphere .23 
23 Merleau-Ponty's post-Husserlian account of embodied intersubjectivity 
and lifeworld fills the lacuna in Habermas's communicative ethics and 
could reply to recent feminist and communitarian critiques of its 
formalism. (Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the 
Foundations of Critical Theory [New York: Columbia UP, 19861; Benhabib 
and Drucilla Cornell, eds., Feminism as Critique (Minneapolis: U of 
Minnesota P, 1987]. Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice 
[Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1982]. Alasdair Maclntyre, After Virtue 
(Indiana: U of Notre Dame P, 1981].) 
Benhabib, critically following Gilligan's attack on Kohlberg's 
moral theory, notes that Habermas develops a formal communicative 
ethic of the generalized self but lacks an ethic of the concrete self, the 
ethic of solidarity and friendship. She calls for integrating both ethical 
perspectives: "The perspective of the generalized other urges us to respect 
the equality, dignity, and rationality of all humans qua humans, while the 
perspective of the concrete other enjoins us to respect differences, 
individual life-histories and concrete needs" (Benhabib, Critique, p. 351). I 
suggest to complement the formal counterfactual—Habermas's validity 
claims of the ethic of communication—with descriptive, hermeneutical, 
rational, and critical-existential evidence. Phenomenology of sympathy 
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3. Mimesis inherited and stabilized by communicative and 
existential ethics requires an intensification of the concrete self through 
will against power. Will against power, not will to discourse counters any 
claimed primacy of will to power in the formation of post-traditional 
identities and life-forms.24 
Will against power maintains the primordial situation of 
disempowered identity in the sense of vertical transcendence, i.e., an 
enabling asymmetry of that other which confronts totality in the very 
identity-formation. If the ideal symmetry conditions of communication 
are to be fulfilled concretely, then such a check on self-deceptive willing is 
called for. The check is, however, provided not by one's positive willing but 
by one's openness to that asymmetrical claim of the other which unmasks 
power-asymmetries in validity- and identity-claims.25 
Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of sympathy does not envision 
vertical transcendence and essential asymmetry, but it already questions 
the descriptive accuracy of any ontological egology. Merleau-Ponty's 
disempowered ego assumes the background of the ideal symmetry condi-
tions of reciprocity, but this symmetry does not preclude, rather 
presupposes, the asymmetrical conditions of its possibility. My third step 
thematizes what communicative ethics requires to sustain itself 
existentially: my argument moves from a symmetrical disempowerment of 
the ego on the basis of the projected ideal communication community to 
the asymmetrical conditions of the possibility of this ideal community in 
radical otherness and vertical transcendence.26 
From a systemic standpoint my good will that harnesses life-world 
imperatives towards the other seems Utopian. It appears Utopian, since 
will to discourse-on its own and even under the conditions of uncon-
strained communication-cannot guarantee to itself that it would not 
emerge as will to power. For this reason, the quasi-transcendental stand-
point in communicative symmetry must be transformed through the 
vertical transcendence of enabling asymmetry conditions: my identity is 
constituted in the claim of the other, not through my good will. 
inhabits the gap between the generalized other of communication and the 
concrete self. While descriptive evidence cannot replace normative 
counterfactual in critique, it is also true that communicative ethics cannot 
be divorced from lifeworld and existential identity-formation. 
24 Cf. my review of Essays in Hermeneutics and Critical Theory by Rudiger 
Bubner in Auslegung (January 1990). 
25 cf. my "Jurgen Habermas at 60" and n. 22 above. 
26 Cf. Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, 
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1969) and Richard A. 
Cohen, ed.. Face to Face with Levinas (Albany: SUNY, 1986), "Dialogue 
with Emmanuel Levinas." 
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Conclusion 
Merleau-Ponty legitimately privileges operative sympathy. This 
sympathy founds and sustains the developmental stage of latent alterity 
and self-identity in ontogenesis and adulthood. 
His counterfactual evidence depicts how ordinary and patholo-
gical failures in sustaining self-identity require the horizon of pre-personal 
sympathy as the distinct condition of their possibility. Sympathy, whether 
primordial or deliberate and thematic, presupposes the absence of 
differentiation between the self and the alter. Sympathy must be the more 
originary attitude than that of jealousy or cruelty. Perception and 
primordial sympathy, contrary to idealism and empiricism, do not consist 
of fragmentary qualities but operate as the horizon of co-existence with 
others. Jealousy, already present in the attitude of children but perfected 
in adult relations, can be understood only as a developmental 'fall' into 
non-differentiation and supplementation of self-identity by the 
fragmented qualities of the desired object. Sympathy cannot be primarily 
a dialectic of the desire to be desired, since such a dialectic begins with a 
phenomenology that illegitimately privileges fragmentary self-identity and 
alterity. Merleau-Ponty argues that love, unlike jealousy, is integral, 
because in sympathy one loves the total person, not merely alienated, 
atomized and fragmented qualities which could be shared by a third 
one.27 
I asked in what sense can the thesis of the primacy of sympathy 
meaningfully speak for the primacy of adult love. If the former primacy is 
the phenomenology of lifeworld, the latter comprises a moral and 
existential issue. The primacy of love and will to discourse is held as the 
moral imperative of the symmetry conditions of reciprocity and equality. 
But will to discourse demonstrates also the impossibility of the total 
reduction to the conditions of its own possibility. Any good will could 
emerge as will to power. This weakness is remedied neither by assuming 
the ubiquity of will to power nor by a postmodern unwillingness to be a 
self.28 Will to discourse meets its own possibility in the enabling 
asymmetry condition of willing against power, in the claim of radical 
otherness. 
27 He argues this point in "Metaphysics and the Novel," SN, pp. 36-40 
against the backdrop of Simone de Beauvoir's L'lnvitie (Paris: Gallimard, 
1956). See also PrP in PoP 26. 
28 Saren Kierkegaard clarifies asymmetrical conditions as will against 
despair: willing to be a self before the radical otherness of God. Despair is 
a form of will to power. Cf. his The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong (New Jersey: Princeton UP, 1980). 
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This conclusion strengthens the phenomenology of sympathy and 
its equal founding primacy in ontogenesis and adulthood. It legitimizes 
neither the death of the subject nor the thesis of the ubiquitous asymmetry 
of a will to power. Neither the four-fold evidence furnished by social 
phenomenology nor the vulnerability of identity stabilized in 
communicative ethics nor the weakness of my will to discourse checked by 
the verticality of existential ethics warrant the postmodern ethic of 
anarchy, anti-humanism, and power. 
From Merleau-Ponty, we have learned that such ethics cannot be 
descriptively, hermeneutically, and rationally validated. He points out that 
human development occurs primarily in disempowerment and only 
secondarily through will to power. The ubiquity and primacy of will to 
power as a thesis, unlike communicative ethics, do not provide any 
measure of falsifiability. If the thesis is asserted at will, then what is 
arbitrarily asserted can be discursively criticized or denied. We were 
brought from the formal quasi-transcendental conditions of symmetry to 
vertical transcendence. But will against power does not flee finitude of 
powerlessness; here one learns and acts through the claim of radical 
otherness and through suffering 29 
NOTE 
* I wish to acknowledge Patricia Huntington, James L. Marsh, Merold 
Westphal, Jurgen Habermas, and the editors of Auslegung for their 
critical comments on the earlier versions of this paper. The paper was 
presented and discussed during my Fulbright year in Germany in Jurgen 
Habermas's Monday night Colloquium (Frankfurt a/M: JGW Universitat, 
Jan 1990). A sequel to this paper, "Merleau-Ponty On Taking The Attitude 
of the Other," appears in The Journal of the British Society for 
Phenomenology Vol. 22, No. 1 (Jan 1991). 
29 On the notion of suffering, cf. thinkers like Metz, Lamb, Gadamer, 
Llvinas, and Kierkegaard: Johannes Baptist Metz's contribution to 
Habermas- Festschrift, in: Axel Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe 
and Albrecht Wellmer, eds., Zwischenbetrachtungen: Im Prozefi der 
AufklSrung (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989), 733ff; Matthew L. 
Lamb, Solidarity With Victims: Towards a Theology of Social 
Transformation (New York: Crossroads, 1982); Hans-Georg Gadamer, 
Truth and Method (New York: Crossroads, 1975), 320; Soren Kierkegaard, 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter 
Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1941), chap. IV, sec. II, A, # ii, 386ff; for 
Levinas, cf. nn26,22 above. 
